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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD JOHNSON and ROBERT 
JOHNSON, d/b/a JOHNSON 
BROTHERS, GENERAL CONTRACTORS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY 
COMPANY AND KIEWIT WESTERN 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
L. P. BIORN, INC. OF WYOMING, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY 
COMPANY AND KIEWIT WESTERN 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The District Judge in his ruling on February 2, 1987, found 
and concluded that the defendant Gallegos Construction Company 
was a materialman and not a sub-contractor of the contractor, 
Kiewit Western Company. The Court further found that materialmen 
do not fall within the scope of the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-56-38 or Title 14, Chapter 1. Finally the 
Court concluded that as the plaintiffs, Johnson Brothers, 
provided equipment to a materialman, Gallegos Construction 
Company, that they did not have a cause of action on the payment 
1 
Case No. 870104 
and 870108 
Argument Priority No. 14B 
bond provided for the protection of sub-contractors. Plaintiffs 
contend that the Court committed error in these conclusions and 
therefore, respectfully raise the issues as follows: 
Is Gallegos Construction Company a sub-contractor of Kiewit 
Western Company fully protected by the payment bond furnished by 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company? 
Is the bond, which was issued by Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company governed by Section 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated or 
Section 63-56-38, Utah Code Annotated? 
Does the bond issued by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company 
cover rental equipment? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State of Utah hired the defendant Kiewit as the general 
contractor of the 2100 South Highway Project (R. 171) for a total 
contract price of $11,491,141.40. Defendant Aetna supplied a 
payment bond on the project. The bond states on its face: 
...this bond is executed pursuant to the provisions of 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, and all liabilities on this bond to all such 
claimants shall be determined in accordance with said 
provisions to the same extent as if it were copied at 
length herein. (See Addendum "A") 
During the course of the construction project, Kiewit hired 
Gallegos to supply gravel to the project (R. 216). Gallegos1 
contract with Kiewit required Gallegos to manufacture and deliver 
approximately 690,000 cubic yards of borrow, 260,000 tons of 
granular borrow, and 128,000 tons of base course with a contract 
value of about $2.5 million. Gallegos used a commercial gravel 
pit, which was used primarily for this project (R. 192), to 
2 
manufacture the gravel to Utah Department of Transportation 
specifications. 
In the course of manufacturing gravel from the pit and 
delivering it to the job site, Gallegos rented certain equipment 
from the plaintiff Johnson Brothers (R. 169-170) for which 
plaintiffs have not been paid in the amount of $16,848.90 plus 
interest (R. 179). 
Prior to filing this action, plaintiffs telephoned a 
representative of Aetna regarding the procedure for obtaining 
payment under the bond (R. 182). The telephone conversation took 
place within the 90 day period required for filing a claim on the 
contractor's bond as required in Sections 14-1-14 and 63-56-38 of 
the Utah Code Annotated (R. 183, 193, 195). During this 
telephone conversation, plaintiffs were directed by Aetna's 
representative to send a written notice of the plaintiff's claim 
as required under Section 14-1-14 of the Utah Code Annotated to 
Kiewit and that the claim would thereby be processed (R. 183). 
Within the 90 day period required under the Sections listed 
above, plaintiffs sent Kiewit a written notice as required under 
Section 14-1-14 of the Utah Code Annotated and as indicated on 
the payment bond (R. 182). Kiewit and Aetna refused and failed 
to pay the amount due plaintiffs from defendant Gallegos, 
plaintiffs therefore filed this Complaint (R. 5-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Gallegos Construction Company entered into a contract with 
the sub-contractor, Kiewit Western Company, to perform a 
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substantial portion of Kiewit Western's contract with the State 
of Utah. Gallegos Construction Company provided customized 
material for the job site. Thus, Gallegos Construction Company 
more appropriately can be classified or identified as a sub-
contractor of the general contractor Kiewit Western Company 
rather than as a materialman or supplier of Kiewit Western. 
Plaintiffs, Johnson Brothers General Contractors, rented 
equipment to Gallegos for use in preparing and delivering 
materials to the job site at the instance of Gallegos 
Construction Company and therefore are protected by the bond 
issues by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and are entitled to 
have this Court reverse the decision of the District Court Judge 
and enter judgment against Aetna Casualty and Surety Company for 
all just amounts due to the plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GALLEGOS IS A SUB-CONTRACTOR UNDER KIEWIT AND THEREFORE THE 
PAYMENT BOND COVERS GALLEGOS1 INDEBTEDNESS TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Under a recent decision by this Court, Gallegos should be 
found to be a subcontractor rather than merely a materialman. In 
Jacobson Construction Company v. Industrial Indemnity Company, 
657 P.2d 1325, (Utah 1983), this Court indicated some of the 
factors which should be considered in making such a 
determination. In its opinion, this Court accepted and approved 
the District Court's Jury Instruction No. 16, which reads: 
A subcontractor means one who has contracted with the 
original contractor for the performance of all or a 
part of the work or services which such contractor has 
himself contracted to perform. 
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In support of this decision, this Court cited with approval a 
California Supreme Court decision, Theisen Free v, County of Los 
Angeles, 54 Cal.2d 170, 5 Cal. Rptr. 161, 352 P.2d 529 (1960), 
and in particular the following language: 
[W]e conclude that one who agrees with the prime 
contractor to perform a substantial, specified portion 
of the work of construction, which is the subject of 
the general contract, in accord with the plans and 
specifications by which the prime contractor is 
bound...is a sub-contractor although he does not 
undertake on himself to incorporate such portion 
of the projected structure into the building. Id. 
at 1328, citing 5 Cal. Rptr. at 161, 352 P.2d at 537. 
In the present action, Gallegos was required to manufacture 
borrow from its own pit according to the Utah Department of 
Transportation specifications. In a case strikingly similar to 
the present case, McElhose v. Universal Surety Company, 182 Neb 
847, 158 N.W.2d 228 (1968), the middleman, a gravel company, had 
contracted with the general contractor, a highway construction 
company, to furnish and deliver gravel to the general contractor 
in a large quantity and on a daily basis. The middleman rented 
two tractors from the plaintiff for use at its gravel pits which 
were located 13, 16, and 28 miles from the project site. During 
the project period, the middleman continued to sell gravel to 
other customers. The Court concluded that the middleman was a 
subcontractor and thus covered by the payment bond. The court 
noted that: 
the written contract between [the general contractor] 
and [the middleman] for furnishing gravel according to 
specifications and for delivering it to the project 
site in the quantity required points toward [the 
middleman] as a subcontractor and not a supplier. Id. 
at 233. 
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The Court further stated: 
We point out that [the middleman] had a written 
contract with [the general contractor] to deliver about 
33,424 cubic yards of gravel at the site of the project 
for the sum of $97,709.50. We thing this contract for 
the delivery of gravel in such a quantity and for such 
a price for material so essential to the construction 
of a highway makes [the middleman] a subcontractor. 
Id. at 234-235. 
In the present action, Gallegos rented equipment from 
Johnson Brothers in order to fulfill its contractual obligation 
to Kiewit of providing 690,000 cubic yards of borrow, 260,000 
tons of granular borrow, and 128,000 tons of base course (R. 169-
170). The value of this contract was nearly $2,500,000.00. The 
overall project was awarded to Kiewit for $11,500,000.00. 
Gallegosf contract with Kiewit represented 21.74% of the overall 
price. As these figures suggest, Gallegos performed a 
substantial and specified portion of the construction project 
without which the project would not have proceeded. Gallegos1 
contractual obligation satisfies the test enunciated by this 
Court in Jacobsen that the subcontractor be a party who performs 
"all or a part of the work or services which [the general 
contractor] has himself contracted to perform." Jacobsen, at 
1328. Gallegos' contractual obligation also satisfies the test 
announced in Theisen that the subcontractor be a party "who in 
the course of the performance of he prime contract constructs a 
definite, substantial part of the work." Theisen, at 537. 
The facts in the present case are also very similar to those 
in Basich Brothers Construction Company v. United States, 159 
F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1946), in which the prime contractor, Basich 
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B r o t h e r s en te red a c o n t r a c t with Duque and F razz in i to _furnish 
l a b o r , supp l i e s and equipment r e q u i r e d to comply wi th c e r t a i n 
p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Bas ich B r o t h e r s c o n t r a c t wi th t h e Uni ted 
S t a t e s . Duque and F razz in i were to produce g r a v e l , rock and sand 
and d e l i v e r i t to Basich Brothers who in tu rn t rucked i t to the 
p r o j e c t . The C o u r t found t h a t Duque and F r a z z i n i were 
s u b c o n t r a c t o r s wi th in the meaning of the Mi l le r Act, basing i t s 
dec i s ion on the fol lowing language from MacEvoy v. United S t a t e s : 
The s u b - c o n t r a c t o r i s one who performs for and t a k e s 
from the prime c o n t r a c t o r a s p e c i f i c pa r t of the labor 
or ma te r i a l requi rements of the o r i g i n a l c o n t a c t , . . . 
I d . a t 183. 
The Court concluded as fo l l ows : 
Duque and F r a z z i n i , having performed for and taken from 
B a s i c h B r o t h e r s a s p e c i f i c p a r t of t h e l a b o r and 
m a t e r i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of [ s p e c i f i c i t e m s of t h e ] 
o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t , f u l l y meet the requirements of t h a t 
t e s t and a r e , t h e r e f o r e , s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s w i t h i n t h e 
meaning and scope of the "Mil ler Act ." Ld. a t 183. 
The Bas i c h c a s e was c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n T i f f a n y 
Cons t ruc t ion v. Hancock and Kelly Cons t ruc t ion Company, 24 Ar iz . 
App. 504, 539 P.2d 978 (1975), as support for t h a t C o u r t ' s view 
t h a t one f ac to r to cons ider in determining whether a supp l i e r was 
in f ac t a s u b - c o n t r a c t o r for the purposes of a bonding s t a t u t e 
was whether the i tems the supp l i e r provided was "customized." 
G a l l e g o s ag reed wi th Kiewi t t o m a n u f a c t u r e b o r r o w and 
g r a n u l a r b o r r o w t o confo rm w i t h t h e Utah D e p a r t m e n t of 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . The m a t e r i a l r e q u i r e d a 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g p r o c e s s b e f o r e being de l ive red to the job s i t e . 
Therefore , con t r a ry to the f ind ing of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t he 
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m a t e r i a l s u p p l i e d by G a l l e g o s s h o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as 
" c u s t o m i z e d . " T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Cour t shou ld hold t h a t , as a 
s u p p l i e r of "customized" m a t e r i a l , Gallegos was a s u b - c o n t r a c t o r 
r a t h e r than a mater ia lman. 
POINT I I 
THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 14-1-14 
GOVERN THE BOND ISSUED IN THIS CASE. 
On January 7, 1985, Aetna furnished a bond at the instance 
of Kiewit pursuant to the requirements of the statutes of the 
State of Utah (See Addendum "A"). The bond, according to its own 
terms was issued under the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1 of 
the Utah Code Annotated. At the top of the document and just 
under the title of the bond is set forth the title and chapter of 
the Utah Code Annotated under which this bond was issued. At the 
center of the printed matter of the bond is the following 
language: 
Provided, however, that this bond is executed pursuant 
to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and all liabilities on 
this bond to all such claimants shall be determined in 
accordance with said provisions, to the same extent as 
if it were copied at length herein. 
Section 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated titled "Actions on 
Payment Bond" provides for the following notice requirements: 
(2) Any person having a contract with a sub-contractor 
of the contractor, but no express or implied contract 
with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, shall 
have a right of action upon the payment bond upon 
giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days 
from the date on which the last of the labor was 
performed or material was supplied... 
The District Court held that rental equipment falls within 
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the scope of Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, effective April 29, 1985 as well as Section 14-1-1 
plaintiff's remedy under the bond. The primary difference 
between the two sections is that Section 63-56-38, as amended in 
1985, requires that the claimant on the bond to provide "written 
notice to the contractor and surety company within 90 days from 
the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material 
was supplied..." (Emphasis added.) Section 14-1-14 as quoted 
above does not require the written notice to be delivered to the 
surety company. 
Although Section 63-56-38 applies to State projects 
generally, the contractors' payment bond indicates that 
obligations under the bond arise "pursuant to the provisions of 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended." 
Therefore, the District Court properly held that the notice 
provisions of that section should control rather than the notice 
provisions as required in Section 63-56-38. 
Even if the District Court had held that the notice 
provisions contained in Section 63-56-38 applied to the instant 
case, the defendants should be estopped from claiming lack of 
notice because Aetna received actual notice of the claim. This 
argument is illustrated by a decision by this Court which applied 
the notice requirement contained in the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. 




 Whiting Brothers Construction Company v. M. & S. 
9 
Construction & Engineering Company, 18 Utah 2d 43, 414 P.2d 961, 
(1966), the prime contractor Whiting Brothers, had been engaged 
to do construction work at the Cedar City, Utah Airport. It had 
sub-contracted a portion of this project to M. & S. Construction, 
which in turn had contracted with Hoyt & Smith for certain 
services and materials. When M. & S. Construction went out of 
business, they failed to pay their obligations to Hoyt & Smith. 
In an action against Whiting Brothers and the surety, the 
question before the Court was "whether Hoyt & Smith could recover 
from Whiting Brothers and their surety when they failed to 
strictly comply with the notice provisions of the Miller Act." 
Id. at 962. After the default of M. & S., Hoyt & Smith discussed 
their claims with responsible agents of Whiting Brothers and were 
assured something would be done to take care of them. In 
addition, WhitingTs attorney wrote Hoyt & Smith acknowledging the 
default of M. & S. and advised that such steps were being taken 
to rectify the situation if possible. 
This Court indicated: 
The Miller Act's dominate purpose is to protect 
laborers and materialmen of sub-contractors and it 
should be liberally construed to effectuate this 
purpose. The purpose of the 90 day notice was to 
enable the prime contractor to protect himself and his 
surety against a delinquent or defaulting sub-
contractor. 1(3. at 962. 
This Court held that even though written notice was not 
given, Whiting Brothers were fully aware of the claim and would 
not have benefited by receipt of the notice. Therefore, the 
Court held that Whiting Brothers could not assert the defense of 
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f a i l u r e by Hoyt and Smith to give the 90 day w r i t t e n n o t i c e . 
In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t 
p l a i n t i f f s c a l l e d A e t n a ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and were g i v e n 
i n s t r u c t i o n s on the procedure for e s t a b l i s h i n g a claim on the 
c o n t r a c t o r ' s bond (R. 183, 193, 195) . P l a i n t i f f s were to ld to 
send w r i t t e n n o t i c e to the prime c o n t r a c t o r , Kiewit , to commence 
t h e c l a i m p r o c e d u r e and t h a t t h e i r remedy would f o l l o w . 
P l a i n t i f f s did so wi thin the 90 day per iod and complied with the 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t e n t i r e l y e x c e p t for s e n d i n g t h e 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e to Aetna (R. 182) . Because Aetna was aware of the 
claim and had given s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n on the method to proceed 
on the c la im, sending an a d d i t i o n a l w r i t t e n n o t i c e to Aetna would 
have accomplished n o t h i n g . Therefore , Aetna should be estopped 
from cla iming t h a t proper n o t i c e was not g iven as r e q u i r e d by 
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , S e c t i o n 14-1 -14 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , and Utah Code 
A n n o t a t e d , S e c t i o n 6 3 - 5 6 - 3 8 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t i s 
s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f s i n i t i a t e d t h e i r s u i t 
a g a i n s t Kiewit and Aetna p r i o r to the e x p i r a t i o n of the 90 day 
per iod in which n o t i c e must be g iven . 
POINT I I I 
THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR EQUIPMENT RENTED IS A VALID OBLIGATION 
UNDER THE APPLICABLE PAYMENT BOND STATUTE. 
Kiewit was required under either Section 14-1-13 or Section 
63-56-38(1)(b) to obtain a payment bond "in an amount equal to 
100$ of the price specified in the contract...for the protection 
of all persons supplying labor and material to the contractor or 
its sub-contractors for the performance of work provided for in 
11 
the contract." Section 63-56-38(1 )(b) , Utah Code Annotated. 
Kiewit obtained the requisite bond from Aetna. 
As a general rule, a statutory bond of the type involved in 
this action is remedial in nature and is entitled to a liberal 
construction. The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting 
the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. Section 270A et seq., language of 
which is similar to the Utah counterpart said that: 
The Miller Act, like the Heard Act, is highly remedial 
in nature. It is entitled to a liberal construction 
and application to effectuate a congressional intent to 
protect those whose labor and materials go into public 
projects. Clifford F. MacEvoy Company v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 102, 88 L. Ed. 1163 (1943). 
Although some jurisdictions have held otherwise, Judge 
Griffin Bell, then with the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, noted that the Miller Act and its predecessor statute 
have been "uniformly construed to include equipment rentals." J. 
W. Carruth v. Standard Accident Insurance, 329 F.2d 690, 693 (5th 
Cir. 1964). 
The Utah counterpart to the Miller Act construed in the same 
liberal fashion would result in the same conclusion. J. F. 
Tolton Investment Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 293 P. 
611 (Utah 1930) was a case where a sub-contractor defaulted in 
payment to plaintiffs for materials and labor. Plaintiffs 
brought suit on the payment bond for various items including a 
claim for an amount due for rental of an engine used on the job. 
In that case, four of the five Justices held with regard to the 
claim for the rental that "under the liberal rule of 
interpretation to which we are committed, we conclude that the 
12 
charge in question is within the obligation of the bond, and the 
surety was properly held liable therefore." Ici. at 615. 
Even if the Court did not liberally construe the Utah 
statutes, a basic rule of statutory construction should lead this 
Court to the conclusion that "labor and material" includes rental 
equipment. As stated in a recent decision by this Court: 
In construing legislative enactments or municipal 
ordinances, the primary responsibility of this Court is 
to give effect to the legislature's underlying intent. 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983). 
See also Arizona Denite Builders, Inc. v. Continental, 
105 Ariz. 99, 459 P.2d 724 (1969). 
In attempting to determine the legislature's intent, the 
Court should look to other statutes which deal with the same 
subject matter. This Court in Murray City cited Sutherland 
Statutory Construction to this effect: 
In the terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that 
whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in 
mind previous statutes relating to the same subject 
matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any 
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision 
was enacted in accord with the legislative policy 
embodied in those prior statutes, and they should all 
be construed together. 
Provisions in the act which are omitted in another 
act relating to the same subject matter will be applied 
in a proceeding under the other act, when not 
inconsistent with its purposes. Prior statutes 
relating to the same subject matter are to be compared 
with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable 
construction, both are to be so construed that effect 
is given to every provision in all of them. 
Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent 
conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed 
to be in harmony with each other. But if there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the new provisions and 
the prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, 
the new provision will control as it is the later 
expression of the legislature. Ld. at 1318. 
In addition to the subject matter, the doctrine of in pari 
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materia applies to "statutes which relate to the same person or 
thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or which have a 
common purpose..." 82 CJS Statutes, Section 366, pp. 801-802. In 
applying this doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court has noted the 
similarity of the lien and bond statutes: 
Because of the common purpose of these lien and 
contractor's bond statutes [referring to Sections 14-2-
2 and 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953)], and their 
practically identical language, adjudications as to 
what is lienable under the former are helpful in 
determining the proper application of the latter. 13 
Utah 2d 339, 341; 374 P.2d 254 (1962). 
The Utah Mechanic's Lien law was amended in 1981 to include 
language specifically referring to rental materials or equipment 
used in construction or improvements. See Section 38-1-3. The 
legislature amended the provisions relating to private contracts 
in 1985 to include similar language about rental equipment. See 
Section 14-2-1. The public contracts and procurement code 
bonding sections (See Sections 14-1-13 and 63-56-38) have not 
been amended to include rental language but it is clear that all 
of the statutes referred to deal with the same class of persons, 
namely those who have furnished labor, materials and equipment on 
construction projects. The Court should construe the statutes 
effecting this class of claims in a rational manner consistent 
with the legislature's intent. Its intent with regard to 
inclusion of those renting equipment is clear from the language 
of the mechanic's lien and private bonding statutes. The 
legislature intended to proved broad coverage and this intent 
should be applied by the court in interpreting the Utah public 
14 
contracts bonding statutes. 
In R. C. Stanhope v. Roanoke Construction Company, 539 F.2d 
992 (4th Cir. 1976), Roanoke was the prime contractor and sub-
contracted to Lockwood. Lockwood rented certain equipment from 
Stanhope and then defaulted on the rental payments and also 
failed to return some of the equipment rented. The only issue on 
appeal was whether Stanhope's rental charges and the value of 
missing rental equipment constituted materials furnished within 
the meaning of the Virginia payment bond statute. The Court held 
that both the rental charges and missing rental equipment 
constituted "materials furnished" under the Code. Chief Judge 
Haynsworth concurred in part and dissented in part. He dissented 
with regard to the missing rental equipment and felt that those 
items were not covered by the term "materials furnished." 
However, he cited a recent amendment to the Virginia Mechanic's 
Lien Statute to include the reasonable rental or use value of 
equipment. He said: 
There is nothing to indicate that the general assembly 
ever intended to provide greater protection for 
materialmen and sub-contractors on private construction 
projects than that furnished to such suppliers on 
public projects. He indicates that the Court's 
logic "strongly suggests the legislative intention 
to equate materialmen and sub-contractors on public 
projects with the statutory protections afforded 
such supplies on private projects. The statement 
by the Supreme Court of Virginia that [its law] is 
remedial and must be given a liberal construction 
convinces me that whatever doubts might arise from 
the adoption in 1968 of the amendment to [mechanic's 
lien laws] should be resolved in favor of a 
construction of the [payment bond statute] so as to 
include the rental value of rental equipment furnished 
within the meaning of "materials." 
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Furthermore, this also logically follows from the 
requirement in the Public Bonding Statutes that the payment bond 
cover "100% of the price specified in the contract." On any 
large public construction project, it is very likely that some 
the costs will include costs of rental equipment. If rental 
equipment is not included in the bond, then the Utah statutes 
require an excess of bonding coverage beyond that necessary to 
protect the sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers. 
Because the payment bond statutes are remedial in nature, 
their provisions should be construed liberally to include rental 
equipment within the definition of "materials" furnished on the 
project. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah hired the defendant Kiewit Western Company 
as general contractor of the 2100 South Highway Project for a 
total contract price of $11,491,141.40. Within the course of the 
construction project, Kiewit Western Company hired Gallegos 
Construction Company as a sub-contractor to manufacture and 
deliver approximately 690,000 cubic yards of borrow, 260 tons of 
granular borrow and 128 tons of base course pursuant to a 
contract with a value of about $2.5 million dollars. Gallegos 
Construction Company entered into an agreement with the 
Plaintiffs, Johnson Brothers General Contractors, to lease 
equipment from plaintiffs for the preparation and delivery of the 
borrow and base course materials to the project job site. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Company provided a 100% performance and 
16 
payment bond for the project pursuant to the requirements of 
Section 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated. Plaintiffs were not paid 
sums which they had earned pursuant to their agreement with 
Gallegos Construction Company. The sum due the plaintiffs is 
$16,848.90 together with interest, attorney's fees and costs. 
Plaintiffs gave proper notice of their claim to the general 
contractor, Kiewit Western Company and the surety, Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Company. Thus, plaintiffs contend that they are 
entitled to have judgment entered in their favor against Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Company in an amount as proven at the time of 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /7;^2~day of July, 1987. 
Attorney /or Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Defendants1 
attorney, Mr. Robert F. Babcock of Walstad & Babcock at 185 South 
State Street, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this / 7&-
day of July, 1987. 




MI_V/U>>i_U rn n u L> \XQ{ 
Robert F. Babcock ((#0158) 
Marv Louise LeCheminant (#4869) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Kiewit Western and Aetna Casualty 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
•2 * * 
^t^-™ 
T t B ' - ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD JOHNSON and ROBERT JOHNSON, 




GALLEGC3 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY 
AND KIEWIT WESTERN COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. C85-7945 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This case came on for non-jury trial on November 19, 1986 before the Court. 
Richard and Robert Johnson ("Plaintiffs") were present and represented by their attorney, 
Gary II. Weight. Defendant Kiewit Western Company was present and both Aetnu 
Casualty & Surety Company and Kiewit Western Company ("Defendants") were 
represented by their attorneys, Robert F. Babcock and Mary Louise LeCheminant. 
FINDFNGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Upon consideration of the evidence and the arguments of counsel the Court 
enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
A. Findings of Fact 
1. The State of Utah hired Kiewit Western Company ("Kiewit") as 
the general contractor for the 2100 South Highway Project. 
2. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company ("Aetna") supplied a bond on 
the project issued pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Tit le 14, Chapter 1 (1953, as 
amended) according to the language found at the top of the bond and within the body 
of the bond, 
3. Kiewit hired Gallegos Construction Company ("Gallegos") to supply 
gravel which (a) was readily available in the market as a stock in trade item and (b) 
could be sold to others in the ordinary course of business without material sacrifice if 
it were not used on the 2100 South Highway Project, 
4. Plaintiffs entered into a lease agreement with Gallegos for the 
lease of certain equipment and all equipment from the Plaintiffs used by Gallegos at 
the commercial gravel pit was either rented or leased. 
5. The Plaintiffs called Aetna within ninety days from the last day 
Plaintiffs provided labor or materials to Gallegos to obtain payment under the bond 
and were told to send written notice of their claim to Kiewit. 
6. The Plaintiffs sent Kiewit written notice and filed this action within 
ninety days from the last day Plaintiffs provided labor or materials to Gallegos. 
B. Conclusions of Law 
1. Defendants are estopped from claiming (a) proper notice was not 
given as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985) and (b) Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 14-1-14 (1983) is not the applicable statute in this matter. 
2. Leased and rental equipment fall writhin the scope of the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985) and Title 14, Chapter 1 (1953, as 
amended). 
3. Gallegos was a materialman and not a subcontractor of Kiewit. 
4. Materialmen do not fall within the scope of the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985) or Title 14, Chapter 1 (1953, as amended). 
5. As Plaintiffs provided equipment to Gallegos, a materialman, they 
- 2 -
h « v o no c a i w o of a c t i o n o n t h e p a y m o n t bond p r o v i d e d f o r \\\© proVtscUon ot 
subcontractors, 
JUDGEMENT 
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees basec upon 
the foregoing findings and conclusions, that the Plaintiffs have no cause of action on 
the payment bond and thus the Court finds in favor of the Defendants, with costs to 
the Defendants, 
J- rtmr nf T^/s^ 198" DATED this day of 
BY THE COURT: 
c; \ 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, on this ^Q'^^^'ay of 
, 1987 to: 
Gary H. Weight 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
LEASE A G R E E M E N T , 
AGREEMENT of lease made and entered into this. 
by and between . . . ^ / M ^ ^ . ^ ^ f ^ S . 
hereinafter called LESSOR and ..l£.A//££.CS. LQ&.£3&J&£$^O...L.Q... 
hereinafter called LESSEE. 
Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, LESSOR does hereby lease to 
LESSEE the following described vehicle: 
1. DESCRIPTION OF VEHICLE: 
M a k e . £ # Z l . Year. Model. ML Serial No.~ Motor No Special Equipment 
2. TERMS OF LEASE: | A 
The commencement date of this Lease shall be as indicated a|gve and this Lease shall expire 
on the . . . . . / ^ T . day of....:v/^3£ , 19..c£~L, or fifteen days after written 
notice by LESSOR of default and expiration. 
3. LEASE PAYMENTS: 
In consideration of the lease of said vehicle, LESSEE shall pay to LESSOR the total sum 
of $ . / < £ ^ pa^bk4ft-ad«mee a*-the-*ate of $ ^&T.. per 4&@£ 
ytes^mh=State oalec taxi The first such monthly payment shall be due and owing on the 1st 
day of the calendar month following the date of execution of this Agreement and the remainder of 
such payments shall be due and owing on the 1st day of each month thereafter during the term 
of this Agreement. LESSEE deposits with LESSOR on execution of this Agreement the sum of 
$....^4?^.tT , to be held in escrow to guarantee completion of lease. In the 
event such monthly payments are fifteen days past due, the LESSOR shall have the right to charge 
LESSEE a penalty fee equal to five (5%) per cent of such past due payment. 
4. ADDITIONAL RENT: . / 
In the event that such vehicle shall be operated in excess ..miles in 
any year of this Lease, then LESSEE agrees to pay to LESSOR an amount equal to „.jfLl.ct:-
cents per mile for each mile such vehicle is driven in excess of said aforementioned mileage figure 
during any such year of this Lease. LESSEE further agrees to provide LESSOR with a report 
each month at the time monthly payments are made of the mileage driven during the month pre-
ceding such payment. 
5. INSURANCE 
LESSEE agrees it shall, at its sole cost and expense, maintain in full force on such vehicle dur-
ing the term of this Agreement automobile bodily injury liability insurance coverage with minimum 
limits of $100,000—$300,000 dollars and automobile property damage liability insurance of a 
minimum amount of $25,000 for each such vehicle, together with actual cash value comprehensive 
insurance and collision insurance subject to $100 deductible on each such vehicle in an insurance 
company acceptable to LESSOR. LESSEE shall furnish to LESSOR a copy of such insurance pol-
icies prior to taking delivery of such vehicle, and LESSEE shall cause LESSOR to he named as an 
additional insured in such policies of insurance and name \J&/fofrC}/!s ^ ^ v ^ 
as Loss Payee; and, further, LESSEE agrees to indemnify and to save LESSOR harmless from and 
against any and all loss, damages, claims, liabilities and expense in any manner arising out of the 
claims, injury or damage to persons or property as a result of LESSEE'S operation of such vehicle. 
6. RETURN OF VEHICLE y/? 
LESSEE agrees that upon expiration of the period for which such vehicle has been leased or 
upon expiration of the rights of LESSEE under the terms and conditions of this Agreement, such 
vehicle shall be returned to the LESSOR in as good condition as such vehicle was when received 
by LESSEE, reasonable wear and tear excepted; and, further, delivery and return of such vehicle 
shall be made at the office of the LESSOR at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
7. OPERATION OF VEHICLE: 
^ a . LESSEE agrees that such vehicle will be operated in a careful manner by licensed drivers, 
and that each such driver shall be selected, employed and controlled by the LESSEE solely, and 
such driver shall be presumed conclusively to be the agent and/or employee of the LESSEE. 
b. LESSEE agrees that such vehicle shall not be operated or used in violation of any federal, 
state or municipal law or regulation. 
LESSEE may at his sole cost and expense paint or affix to said vehicle any appropriate 
advertisement; provided, however, that LESSEE shall on the termination of this Agreement pay to 
LESSOR an amount equal1 to the cost and expense of removal of such advertisement and restore 
the finish of such vehicle to its original condition. 
fJA LESSEE agrees to maintain and pay all repairs made on said automobile not covered by 
factory warranty. 
M-e. All repairs for physical damage to such vehicle whenever possible shall be made at LES-
SOR'S place of business, or the permission of LESSOR shall be first had and obtained to make 
such repairs elsewhere. 
Mi Such vehicle shall be used only within the boundaries of the continental United States. 
A>ng. LESSEE agrees that he shall not overload such vehicle beyond its rated capacity, and in 
the event of overloading, LESSEE agrees to pay all damages to such vehicle and tires resulting from 
overloading. 
LESSEE assumes and agrees to pay all towing charges and any other cost and expense re-
lating to operation of such vehicle unless, such costs and expenses are incurred with the LESSOR'S 
written consent, 
8. OWNERSHIP OF VEHICLE: 
At all times during the term of this Lease such vehicle shall be the property of LESSOR, and 
the LESSEE shall have the sole right to use the same, subject to the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement; and LESSEE shall have no property interest in and to such vehicle. 
9. DEFAULT BY LESSEE: 
In the event LESSEE files or there is caused to be filed a petition in bankruptcy or shall make 
or have made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if a receiver shall be appointed for 
LESSEE, or if LESSEE shall have permitted or suffered any attachment, levy, execution to be 
made, levied or entered against or in any respect of any or all of LESSEE'S property, then upon 
giving five days written notice to LESSEE, the rights of LESSEE under this Agreement shall ex-
pire. 
In the event that LESSEE fails to make any payment due and owing hereunder for a period 
of fifteen days after such payment is due, then the rights of LESSEE under this Agreement shall 
expire. 
In the event that LESSEE shall fail to perform any of the terms and conditions required of 
LESSEE to perform under this Agreement, and upon fifteen days written notice of such failure to 
perform, then the rights of LESSEE under this Agreement shall expire. 
10. DAMAGES: 
In the event that LESSEE fails to perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement and the rights of LESSEE hereunder expire then LESSEE agrees to pay to LESSOR 
any and all amounts of unpaid monthly payments computed to the date of return of such vehicle to-
gether with any loss or damage which LESSOR may suffer as a result of the breach of this Agreement 
by LESSEE, it being mutually agreed between the LESSOR and the LESSEE that the minimum 
amount of such loss as a result of any such breach as liquidated damages due and payable on the 
date of expiration of this Lease shall be a sum equal to one-third of the monthly payments that 
would have been paid if the Lease had continued in full force and effect for the period set forth in 
paragraph two above without consideration of the shortening of the term by reason of default. 
11. ATTORNEY'S FEE: 
LESSEE agrees to pay LESSOR a reasonable attorney's fee in the event that an attorney is 
employed to enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement by LESSOR. 
12. NOTICES: 
Any notice required to be given hereunder shall be deemed completed two days after posting 
with postage prepaid in regular U. S. mail to each of the parties at the respective addresses in-
dicated in the initial paragraph of this lease Agreement. 
13. AMENDMENTS: 
Any amendment in this Agreement must be made in writing and attached to this Agreement. 
This Agreement contains all of the agreements between the parties hereto and no representations 
either oral ,or written made before this Agreement shall be considered a part of this Agreement un-
less included herein. 
14. BENEFIT: 
This Agreement shall be binding upon and enure to the benefit of the legal representatives, heirs, 
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto; provided, however, that LESSEE shall not have the 
right to assign or sublet the vehicle leased hereunder. Whenever herein the singular number is used, 
the same shall include the plural and the masculine gender shall include the neuter. 
15. ELECTION OF REMEDIES: 
The LESSOR shall have the sole right of enforcement of the terms and conditions of this Agree-
ment at its sole discretion and the failure to exercise any rights of the LESSOR hereunder shall not 
constitute a waiver of such rights, it being mutually agreed between the parties that the remedies 
of the LESSOR hereunder are cumulative. 
16. Customer agrees to purchase and pay property taxes and license fees for all years pertaining to 
this lease except the originating license fees. 
17. This lease and any cars leased thereunder will be subject to any rights and interest in and to 
said cars under any respective contract of/or contracts that any lending institution may hold on the 
same. 
The undersigned hereby assigns to-
all rentals and funds due and to become due the undersigned assignment is made and given as 
security for any and all obligations due or to become due from the undersigned to said bank. 
By 
J//f«t /~ tfS~ Date; ****** T y 
18. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS: 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this instrument, in triplicate, this 
day and year first above written. 
LESSEE LESSOR 
V.SST... 87-0335018 MATERIAL CONTRACT Job Hand** _ * 0 8 0 _ £ ^ . 
THIS AGREEMENT. mad« this 2 7 t h . day of 2 * £ . ™ 19_:L~. by and between 
Gallegoa Construction Co.,Jfac^;^566 West H1gQWOod **•» Kaarna, UT 84118 
(Seller** Name, AddraM and Phone No.) 
J01=966=8893 hereinifter ^ the ^  and _Me^Jt„ We^ern ._^ , . 
(Contractor Nana, Addr— and Phoae No.) Y / f 
Murray, Utah 84107^0780 801-266-8879
 § h e r e i n a f t e r^ theCoiltIBetorp WITNESSETH: /> 
Section 1. The Seller agrees to furnish all material set forth in "Section 2" hereof necessary in the construction of State ' J 
Route 201, 2100 South Freeway, 3850 to 
^!^^^^%j».J^^!^^lz!^Q^LL lor ^^.^.^^^^^.J^^^l^^^. 
(Name of Project) (Owner) 
hereinafter Called the Owner, at r . _ . E . ~ ~ ~ T ... V_..Z.>...^Z.^.?^T , in accordance with the terms and 
(Location of Project) 
provisions of the Contract between the Owner and the Contractor, dated *~~~?. , 19 » and the General 
and Special Conditions. Drawings and Specifications prepared by J ^ ^ . M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ % ^ L ^ . ^ ^ . 9 ^ ^ % 9 ^ . . 
.(Architect or Engineer) 
hereinafter called the Architect or Engineer, forming a part of the Contract between the Contractor and the Owner, all of which shall be 
considered part of this Agreement by reference thereto, and the Seller agrees to be bound to the Contractor by the tsnns.&nd wg-
vis ions thereof. ROUTE ALL PA YMENlTR "3 
* Section 2. It is agreed that the materials to be furnished by the Seller are as follower-) £ ^ £ £ 5 AND USE TAK^BV*&& 
Quantity * Matarial BEFORE FILING. " ' 




•* 'M *> v**. i+-.4\-* 
Ml material furnished under this Agreement is to be delivered F.O.B .„ .? 
. with freight allowed to ^M^Mijl^Uh-
Sect ion 3. The Contractor agrees tojpav the Seller for the materials to be furnished, as aforesaid, the sum of . . f*~*®• * * ? ~ . ™ £ ? . ^ 
SJj;ty..mQUsand...and_..no/10p_ __ DoUars (*?60,00.0..0^
 subject 
3 additions and deductions for changes as may result from operation of Contractor's contract with Owner, as follows: 
90 
Partial payments will be made to the Seller each month in an amount equal to Z~f. % of the value of materials delivered 
> the site, computed on the basis of the prices set forth above, of the quantity as estimated by the Architect or Engineer, less the 
ggregate of previous payments made hereunder, but such partial payments shall not become due to Seller until 10 days after the Con-
actor receives payment for such materials from the Owner. If the Contractor receives payment from the Owner for less than the full 
alue of materials delivered to the site but not yet incorporated into the work, the amount due to the Seller on account of such materials 
slivered to the site shall be proportionately reduced. No partial payment to t}ie Sel lers hall operate as approval or acceptance of the 
:aterials furnished hereunder. Upon complete performance of this Material Contract by the Seller and final approval and acceptance 
the materials by the Owner, the Contractor will make final payment to the Seller of the balance due him under this Material Contract 
ithin .......ASf. days after full payment for such materials has been received by the Contractor from the Owner. If at any t ime 
ior to final payment hereunder, the Owner reduces the amount of retainage withheld from the Contractor, the Contractor may, at i ts 
le discretion, reduce accordingly the retained percentage withheld from the Seller. 
The Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become due to the Seller, any sum or sums owing by the Seller to the 
mtractor; and in the event of any breach by the Seller of any part of this Agreement, or in the event of any lien, claim or other lia-
lity asserted against the Contractor, arising out of the Seller's performance hereunder * K ; A #U- C-TI~ ».—i > *--•— 
KNOW ALL MIN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
Th*t. . . .H?Jf iLHf . f .L5^?. . .?S- . bereieificr referred to a* the 
••PrtmclpA}." mad ._.£&?..£.?.^£..£*£H?.Lj&^ ~ -
• OorporaUoo organised aod ejdeUAf under tbe U » i of tbe Stele of - •«. . . .—-
•It* l u yrfeclp*) offie* U U~ C.t, of . . ^ H ^ i . J S S S f . f i . ' . f . ^ . fcer»l»*fur w / « r « d io o th< 
•Iturety/* are bald aod firmly bound ualotbe Stale of Utah by aod through tbe Utah DeparUDCot of Traesportaaoa. 
beraiaafUr referred to as the •'Ohiigwe." U tbe amount of . E i ^ . i l l ^ f . l L * £ ! L J [ 2 H 
j m e T h o u s a n d One Hundred For t £ - o n e • n d ^ A 0 / 1 0 0 ^ - - - - - - - - ^ - | > o l j t T i ^ U f 6 9 1 , 1 4 1 . 4 0 
Ibr tbe payment whereof. Ibe aaid Principal and Surety biod theaeel*ea. tbair heirs, adfointetreior*. «jLecutor*. 
•uccetftort and aes lpis . fotatly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
WHEREAS, tbe Principal baa aotered loto a certain written coot r act with tbe Obligee, daiad tbe 
<.y of _ . 1» . . . . to construct . . < ? F . ? i f . ^ 
S i g n i n g ^ _ _ 
Io tbe County of . i l * ? £ . £ 5 h S
 M . . . , | u u of Utah, Project Ko. .^.L"ftl?.t?.5i 
lor tbe approximate mm of E ^ c v c n ^ M l l L l . ? . " . J j D V 5 Hundred^N ine5X7J?.I2J?..J!!5?"s.^Ild 9P*
 #
H u n < J r e d 
J . S F . t t : . ^ ^ ( sJ i i . *? luA*A. - . f . 2 . . . .K -bleb contract la bereby referred 
to and made a part hereof aa fully and to tbe I U D C extent as if copied at lecg*.h herein. 
NOW. THERE FOR£. tbe ooodtUoo of tbla ©ciJptioo It ouch, tbat If tbe said Principal ahal! pay all claimants 
supplying labor or enate rials to bits or bit subcootractors io tbe prosecution of tbe wort provided for In aaid 
cootrart. then. Ibis obligation shall be void, otherwise to remaio lo full force aod effect. 
PROVIDED. HO^TVER. that this bood la executed pursuant to tbe prorlslooa of Title 24. Chapter 1. Utai 
Code Annotated. 19S3, aa amended, aod all liabilities,on tbia bood to all such claimants aball be d « u m l t a i in 
accordance with aaid prorlsiocs. to tbe suae extent as If It were copied el lesgtb bereia. 
IK WITNESS WHEREOF, tbe aaid Principal aod Surety have signed aod aeaJed this Instrument this 7.P.t\... 
is> of JL9.av.?jc}: i9...£L 
jJ::l£?l^d^^&d£j&>j}kj&. ..fxflnL.M...JPl«ft.lk....Yji<:«..P.j;e&idf.at..(S«4j) 
V e r o n i c a M a l d o n a d o Prtaclp4] 
l e r r i l y n n \ . Kremer • V ^ J A t t o m e y - l o - F a f t ^ ^ j 
TATE OF JJX&S NEBRASKA J a c k i R. J o h n s t o n 
O W T Y O r f t y ^ * ^ S DOUGLAS' 
~ . - . . . . : !? i lW. . . ? .* .~42hP^ being first duly ewom oo oath disposes aod says. thai*bc Is tbe 
ttormey-le-FectofXaeX I t e . . A j e . t J ) a . £ a a U & L W . . ; ^ 
ad tbaitbe te o\ily authorlted to eaacute and deliver tbe foregoing obligation, tbat aaid Company Is e*ithorUed 
I'eaecute tbe same, and baa complied la all respects with the lavs of Utah la reference to becoming sole surety 
fwo bonds, undertftxtngf. and obligations, ^ N ^ J , y ) ^ / j /? 
J o h n s i - ^ ^ - . 
Kub*crllicd and swore to before me thJ§ Zt.tX... day of ...--**• ........ 
Ncury Public- Pamela S. Pruict 
y Ct«nmi»«iutt etpirrs: 11/.1&/.&7. ~
 v . . . . . . . r A 
I A w I'l'ltOVKU 
M l t U l SOTAtT-Htic 4 l^wtOsJ 
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tractor but for the benefit of the state, the cred- Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 
itors and the surety. State ex rel. McBride v. (1938). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative A.L.R. — Duty of public authority to die-
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 127. close to contractor information, allegedly in its 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' possession, affecting cost or feasibility of 
Bonds § 43 et seq.; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182. 
Works and Contracts § 99. Key Numbers. — States «- 101. 
C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States § 119. 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract for which a payment bond 
is furnished under this chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days 
from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was 
supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for any amount 
unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the amount 
due. 
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but 
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment 
bond, shall have a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written 
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person shall state in the 
notice the amount claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was 
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be served 
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(3) Any person may obtain from the appropriate political entity a certified 
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and 
postage. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the con-
tents, execution, and delivery of the original. 
(4) Any action instituted on the payment bond shall be brought in the 
appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to be 
performed. The action shall be commenced within one one year after the 
furnishing of materials or labor, except if the claimant is a subcontractor of 
the contractor, the action shall be commenced within one year from the date 
on which final payment under the subcontract became due. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, ft 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of contract. 
Claims of creditors against contractor. 
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Last day material furnished. 
Lien of laborers or materialmen. 
Purpose and construction of act. 
Timeliness of notice. 
Abandonment of contract. 
A contract could not be regarded as aban-
doned if its terms and conditions were per-
formed by surety company instead of by the 
contractor. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914). 
Cla ims of c red i to r s against contractor. 
The statute dealt only with actions against 
the surety; claims of creditors against the con-
tractor were not affected thereby and could be 
asserted at any time within the general statute 
of limitations. State ex rel. McBride v. Camp-
bell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 (1938). 
Last day material furnished. 
Date on which the last of material was fur-
nished was the delivery date for purposes of 
this section and it was not extended by subse-
quent substitution of new and different con-
trols to correct the supplier's error. A.A. 
Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 24 
Utah 2d 369, 472 P.2d 424 (1970). 
Liens of laborers or materialmen. 
Although a workman or materialman could 
not acquire a lien on a public building for labor 
or material furnished in the construction of 
such building in view of § 38-1-1, he might 
have a preferential right to money in the 
hands of the public corporation to be used in 
the construction of the building under this sec-
tion. Mountain States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-
Allen Co., 63 Utah 384, 225 P. 811 (1924). 
P u r p o s e and construction of act. 
Former law, insofar as it allowed "any per-
son" supplying labor or materials to sue, was 
highly remedial, and was, in furtherance of 
justice, to receive a liberal construction and ap-
plication so as to accomplish its real object and 
purpose. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914), applying Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed. 
The purpose of the former statute was to en-
able creditors of or claimants against contrac-
tor on public buildings to collect for work and 
materials furnished by them ratably and equi-
tably from contractor and his bondsmen in all 
cases to the full amount and extent of the 
surety bond. Board of Educ. v. West, 55 Utah 
357, 186 P. 114 (1919). 
Timeliness of notice. 
Materialman having delivered goods to sub-
contractor of state-owned bridge project could 
not hold the prime contractor or surety liable 
for payment where he had no contractual rela-
tionship with the prime contractor and did not 
give ninety-day notice to the contractor; under 
the prior law, plaintiff had no action against 
the prime contractor or surety because the ac-
tion was not commenced within one year of the 
date of final settlement of the bridge contract 
by the state. American Oil Co. v. General Con-
tracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486 
(1966). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur . 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 114 et seq. 
C.J .S . — 81A C J . S . States § 125. 
Key Numbers. — States •=» 101. 
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivision failing to 
obtain bond. 
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails to obtain a payment bond, 
it shall, upon demand by a person who has supplied materials or performed 
labor under the applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person, 
and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his account against the 
appropriate political entity in any court having jurisdiction in the county in 
which the contract was to be performed. The action shall be commenced 
within one year after the furnishing of materials or labor. 
734 
63-56-37. Stale Affairs in General U l A H { I* 
particular method of construction contracting 
management for each project. itat 
63-56-37. Bid security requirements. 
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least S4b of 
the amount of the bid shall be required for all 
competitive sealed bidding for construction contr-
acts. Bid security shall be a bond provided by a 
surety company authorized to do business in this 
state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form 
satisfactory to the state. 
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requ-
irement for bid security set forth in the invitation 
for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to 
rules and regulations, it is determined that the 
failure to comply with the security requirements is 
nonsubstantial. 
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrev-
ocable for the period specified in the invitation for 
bids, except as provided in section 63-56-20(6). If 
a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before 
award, no action shall be taken against the bidder 
or the bid security. Htt 
63-56-38. Bonds accessary when contract to 
awarded. 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the 
following bonds or security shall be delivered to the 
state and shall become binding on the parties upon 
the execution of the contract: 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the 
state, in an amount equal to lOOVt of the price 
specified in the contract, executed by a surety 
company authorized to do business in this state or 
any other form satisfactory to the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in 
an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in 
the contract, executed by a surety company autho-
rized to do business in this state or any other form 
satisfactory to the state, for the .protection of all 
persons supplying labor and material to the contra-
ctor or i u J U i t ^ t r a c t p ^ of the 
work provided for in the contract. 
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the require-
ment of a performance or payment bond where a 
bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of 
the state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or mat-
erial to the contractor or subcontractor for the work 
provided in the contract, in respect of which a 
payment bond is furnished under this section, who 
has not been paid in full within 90 days from the 
date on which the last of the labor was performed 
or material was supplied by the person for whom 
the claim U made, may sue on the payment bond 
for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is insti-
tuted and may prosecute the action for the amount 
due the person. Any^person haying a contract with a 
subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or 
•?1^M?fLj^JrIII*c^L.^Ll*L the contractor furnishing the 
PfjmiejiL^bonJ^ has alright of action upon the 
PjyjQSOi-hond. juponi_fjvinf written notice to the 
contxactojLand surety company within90 days from 
the date on which the last of the labor was perfo-
rmed or material was supplied by the person for 
whom the claim is made. The person shall state in 
the notice the amount claimed and the name of the 
party for whom the labor was performed or to 
whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be 
served by registered or certified mail, postage 
prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at 
any place the contractor or surety company maint-
ains an office or conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond ] 
be brought in the district court of the cou 
which the construction contract was to be pcrfq 
No suit may be commenced by a claimant under-j 
section more than 180 days after a surety 
denies that claimant's claim The obligee nan»o$J 
the bond need not be joined as a party in the suit 
63-56-39. Form of toads -Effect of certified 
copy.
 ?i 
The form of the bonds required by this part sifcg 
be established by rules and regulations. Any pester 
may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond 
upon payment of the cost of reproduction of J|£ 
bond and postage, if any. A certified copy trffj 
bond shall be prima facie evidence of the conup^ 
execution, and delivery of the original. ^ejflji 
Part F. Contract Clauses "*J 
63-54-40. Require* coatract daases • ComfmfOom #f ^M 
price adjastaseats • Use of rales tod regataUoas. , ^ § 
63-54-41. Cortiflcaiioa of caaate order. 
Use of 
63-56-40. Required coatract clauses -
Cosapatatioa of price adjustmeats • 
and regatatiOM. 
(1) Rules and regulations shall require 
construction contracts and may permit or 
for state contracts for supplies and services1! 
lusion of clauses providing for adjust! 
prices, time of performance, or other ap 
contract provisions, and covering the fo 
subjects: 
(a) The unilateral right of the state to 
writing changes in the work within the scope < 
contract and changes in the time of perfo 
the contract that do not alter the scope of 
tract work; 
(b) Variations occurring between 
quantities of work in a contract and actual j 
ties; 
(c) Suspension of work ordered by the^ 
and 
(d) Site conditions differing from those 
ated in the construction contract, or on 
encountered, except that differing site conditfoas 
clauses required by the rules and regulations aaf£ 
not be included in a construction contract when t k 
contract is negotiated, when the contractor provifB 
the site or design, or when the parties have othjtJv 
wise agreed with respect to the risk of differing fit$ 
conditions. ^ 
(2) Adjustments in price pursuant to clauses pfpr 
mulgated under subsection (1) shall be computed^ 
one or more of the following ways: - ~ n | 
(a) By agreement on a fixed price adjustment 
before commencement of the pertinent performance 
or as soon thereafter as practicable; ^4. 
(b) By unit prices specified in the contract 0 
subsequently agreed upon; -., $ 
(c) By the costs attributable to the events ft 
situations under the clauses with adjustment ,9f 
profit or fee, all as specified in the contract, or 
subsequently agreed upon; »>» 
(d) In any other manner as the contracting 
parties may mut ually agree, or; ->t 
(e) In the absence of agreement by the parties, 
by a unilateral determination by the state of the 
costs attributable to the events or situations under 
the clauses with adjustment of profit or fee, ail as 
computed by the state in accordance with applicable 
sections of the rules and regulations issued under 
4 8 4 For ANNOTATIONS, please consult toe UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS p££. U * 
